INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS ACCORDING TO HWANG JANG YOP

Evidences: Defectors - Hwang Jang Yop on Inter-Korean Relations

(http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/nis-docs/hwang7.htm)

North Korea's Southern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations

(1) Basic Line (Unification by force)

0. Previous plan at unification by Kim Il-sung involved fomenting and instigating a "Democratic Revolution for National Liberation and People's Democracy in South Korea," and unification under a confederation with a new regime in the south, coupled with use of force if necessary.

0. Unification by use of force is the only method Kim Jong-il considers feasible. While the junior Kim acknowledges economic disparities, North Korea believes it has enough power to guarantee unification by force, barring intervention from the United States.

0. Policy also includes expansion of the military, demands for the withdrawal of the USFK, and attempts to sow seeds of disintegration of the ROK and establish an underground communist party organization. These efforts are in progress, North Korea's own economic crises notwithstanding.

0. Establishment of a new intelligence organization devoted to collection of military intelligence from the ROK and overseas.

(2) CONFEDERATION TACTIC (UNIFICATION BY COOPERATION)

0. Promoting disintegration of the ROK from within and the use of force remains the basic line of North Korea southern policy. North Korea presently considers the situation in South Korea to be "ripe" for a socialist revolution by virtue of student demonstrations and political turmoil.

0. Kim Jong-il's decision to maintain the old policy stems from his adherence to "the wishes of his father" for unifying the peninsula by force. Moderate voices in North Korea are virtually nonexistent concerning its southern policy.

0. The confederation plan is nothing more than a political cover for North Korea's attempt to keep the international community at bay while sowing chaos within the ROK, thereby leading to socialist revolution and unification by cooperation with the resulting socialist regime in the south.

0. The succession of power is not likely to lead to changes in North Korea's policy and basic attitudes towards South Korea, as the junior Kim is fully aware that reforms will cause him to lose his grip on power and lead to the collapse of his regime.

(3) FORMULATION OF SOUTH KOREA POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION

0. Operations against the ROK are supervised by the Reunification Front Division of the Workers Party, but other agencies such as the Social/Cultural, Tactical, and Investigation Divisions as well as the Reconnaissance Division of the Defense Ministry are allowed to formulate individual plans for submission for approval by Kim Jong-il.

0. Cooperation between different departments is entirely under the purview of Kim Jong-il, and operations are conducted by that particular department without being subject to command, cooperation, nor revision by any party other than Kim Jong-il himself.

(4) INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE

[Attitudes on negotiation]

0. All dialogue is described as an "engagement with the enemy," and all strategies and tactics are reviewed and approved by Kim Jong-il.

0. The Unification Front Division of the Worker's Party is responsible for formulation of all North Korean strategies for inter-Korean dialogue, with the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland or the State Council conducting dialogue according to such plans.

0. The North's apparent positive response to the high-level talks between South and North Korea was a political ploy for relaxing South Korean vigilance and improving North Korea's international reputation. Prime Minister Yon Hyung-mook was a virtual puppet throughout the talks.

[Summit Talks]

0. North Korea's agreement to hold summit talks in Seoul is a product of their calculation/expectations of widespread support for Kim by South Koreans upon his arrival at the ROK capital.

0. Discussions on the confederation plan and inter-Koran economic cooperation are the main North Korean agenda for the summit.

[Four-party Talks]

0. North Korea's appearance at the Four-party Talks is not likely, barring direct provision of rice. Circumspection and delaying tactics by North Korea are distinct possibilities.

0. The "three plus one" formula proposal by North Korea is based on disdain for Chinese "interference" in what they consider to be an internal matter.

0. There is no opposition to negotiations with the US among the government rank and file, as they deem the talks an opportunity for enhancement of Kim Jong-il's prestige and reputation. Most, however, remain steadfastly opposed to the Four-party Talks.

[Civilian contacts & exchange]

0. The Chairman of the North Korean Christian League, Kang Young-sup, is nothing more than a mouthpiece announcing formulas devised by the Unification Front Division. Detention in concentration camps is the usual punishment for adherents of religion or for those engaging in actual religious practices.

0. All civilian contact by North Korea is supervised by the Unification Front Division under direct orders from Kim Jong-il, in order to sow confusion in the ROK and foment anti-government activity among dissident organizations and groups.

0. North Korean policy is usually an attempt to justify refusal for dialogue between authorities and mollify international criticism, in addition to eliciting calls for civilian contact with the North and preventing unity in the ROK's public opinion on unification. Last but not least, the policy provides a political bargaining chip for additional economic aid.

[Economic cooperation]

0. North Korean policy on inter-Korean economic cooperation is presided over by the Committee for Promotion of Economic Cooperation, operating under the North Korean government's International Economics Committee. Introduction of foreign capital into the Najin-Sunbong area, development of Kumgang Mountain and its vicinity, and contact with members of the ROK business sector are its main responsibilities.

0. Reports of plans for development of Silk Island as a Special Economic Zone and tourist area are without significance, as such work involves organization of Chinese tourists for a one-day trip, which would not amount to significant progress in promoting development of the North Korean economy.

0. Opening the Najin-Sunbong area is an effort to avoid accusations from the international community of isolationism. North Korea has no intention of permitting investment by South Korean firms, and in instances where it is allowed, North Korea will not permit active management of operations.

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